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INDIANS AND INVADERS: THE CMZENSHIP CLAUSE AND
ILLEGAL AIENS
Gerard N. Magliocca*
The Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of
citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the
protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens,
with the exceptions and qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of
foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of
enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and
with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian
tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes.
-United States v. Wong Kim Ark'
A constitutional amendment may be required to change the rule whereby
birth in this country automatically confers U.S. citizenship, but I doubt it.
-Richard Posner
2
INTRODUCTION
Immigration both defines and challenges our national identity,
and hence few topics stir more intense feelings than the treatment of
illegal aliens (or undocumented workers).' In the current debate on
this issue, the courts are taking a back seat to militias, street protests,
talk radio, and populist books that are all trying to redefine the legal
culture.4 Nonetheless, one part of this cacophony that may spill over
* Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. J.D., Yale University 1998;
B.A., Stanford University 1995. Thanks to my colleagues Dan Cole and Maria Lopez for
their thoughtful comments.
1 169 U.S. 649,693-94 (1898).
2 Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 621 (7th Cir. 2003) (PosnerJ., concurring).
3 Even the terminology used to describe this phenomenon is controversial, as many observ-
ers think that "illegal alien" is a pejorative term. This Article nonetheless uses that phrase
because it is the most common one in public discourse.
4 See, e.g., Peter Yoxall, Comment, The Minuteman Project, Gone in a Minute or Here to Stay?
The Origin, History and Future of Citizen Activism on the United States-Mexico Border, 37 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 517 (2006) (describing a citizen militia that seeks to draw atten-
tion to illegal immigration); Sonya Geis & Michael Powell, Hundreds of Thousands Rally in
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into litigation is the rule that a child born here to illegal aliens is a• • 5
citizen. This constitutional custom was not contested for most of the
twentieth century but is now under sharp attack for rewarding unlaw-
ful action and providing an incentive for foreigners to cross the bor-
der.6 Indeed, no less an authority than Judge Richard Posner says
that the current citizenship policy for these children "makes no
sense" and can be repealed by a federal statute.
The origin of a challenge to constitutional orthodoxy is often
hard to pinpoint, but in this case the revisionism can be traced to a
book written by Peter H. Schuck and Rogers M. Smith in the 1980s. s
They argued that the Fourteenth Amendment's mandate-that all
persons born here must also be "subject to the jurisdiction" of the
United States to be citizens-could be read to exclude the children of
illegal aliens.9 The historical support for this claim rests in large part
Cities Large and Small, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2006, at A8 (noting how hundreds of thou-
sands joined in a national "Day of Action" against what they saw as a punitive immigration
bill). For some recent popular books that take a critical look at the issue, see generally
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE THIRD WORLD INVASION AND
CONQUEST OF AMERICA (2006); LOU DOBBS, WAR ON THE MIDDLE CLASS: HOW THE
GOVERNMENT, BIG BUSINESS, AND SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS ARE WAGING WAR ON THE
AMERICAN DREAM AND HOW To FIGHT BACK (2006).
5 This principle does not rest on any judicial holding. It is based instead on dictum from
the Wong Kim Ark case and longstanding practice. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 693-94;
see also David A. Martin, Membership and Consent: Abstract or Organic?, 11 YALEJ. INT'L L.
278, 280-81 (1985) (reviewing PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP
WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985)) ("Dictum so widely
repeated and, apparently, so easily accepted by nearly all Americans may deserve more
respect.... ."). Thus, it is more accurate to call the rule a form of customary constitu-
tional law.
6 See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 5, at 94-95 ("When... combined with the powerful lure
of the expanded entitlements conferred upon citizen children and their families by the
modern welfare state, the total incentive effect of birthright citizenship may well become
significant."); Charles Wood, Losing Control of America's Future-The Census, Birthright Citi-
zenship, and Illegal Aliens, 22 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 465, 497 (1999) (contending that the
rule "creates a significant additional incentive for illegal immigration").
7 Ofoji, 354 F.3d at 621 (Posner,J., concurring). The constitutional custom is codified in 8
U.S.C. § 1401 (2005), and hence Congress would need to take action to alter the status of
future children born here to illegal immigrants.
8 See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 5, at 5 (stating that a change in the birthright citizenship
for children of illegal aliens "has to our knowledge never been seriously considered"); see
also GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAW 166 (1996) (identifying Schuck and Smith's book as the source of the
revisionist claims); Joseph H. Carens, Who Belongs? Theoretical and Legal Questions About
Birthright Citizenship in the United States, 37 U. TORONTO L.J. 413, 430 (1987) (noting that
prior to Schuck and Smith's book, "[flew issues of constitutional law ha[d] seemed more
clearly settled than birthright citizenship").
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.... ."); SCHUCK &
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on the fact that the "subject to the jurisdiction" clause excluded the
Native American Tribes from birthright citizenship.0 Drawing on this
point, Schuck and Smith reasoned that the text requires more than
"the individual's subjection to the government's police power and
criminal jurisdiction."" In their view, there must also be "a reciprocal
relationship between them at the time of birth, in which the govern-
ment consented to the individual's presence and status and offered
him complete protection.0 2 Though this analysis is not widely ac-
cepted, the book remains an important touchstone in the illegal im-
migration debate.
1 3
This Article untangles the citizenship issue for the children of il-
legal aliens by showing that Schuck and Smith's analogy to Native
Americans is flawed for two reasons. First, the Framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment viewed the "subject to the jurisdiction" (or citi-
zenship) clause as a way of enhancing tribal autonomy, not as a tool
for limiting citizenship. 14 As a result, the text does not have an exclu-
SMITH, supra note 5, at 6 (stating that this "expresses a constitutional commitment to citi-
zenship based on mutual consent-the consent of the national community as well as that
of the putative individual member"); Wood, supra note 6, at 509 ("[T]he rationale that
underlies the denial of birthright citizenship to the children of parents who are not fully
subject to the formal jurisdiction of the United States applies also to parents who are con-
tinuously disobedient, yet cannot in a practical sense be brought before United States
courts to answer for it.").
10 See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1884) (confirming this interpretation); S. REP. No.
41-268, at 10 (1870) ("[T]hose who framed the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment... under-
stood that the Indian tribes were not made citizens, but were excluded by the restricting
phrase, 'and subject to the jurisdiction' ....); NEUMAN, supra note 8, at 167 (stating that
Schuck and Smith "focused especially on the denial of citizenship to Native Americans liv-
ing under tribal authority").
11 SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 5, at 86.
12 Id.
13 See, e.g., Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 621 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring) (cit-
ing Schuck and Smith's book as authority for his conclusion that Congress probably can
repeal by statute birthright citizenship for children born here to illegal aliens); Dan Stein
& John Bauer, Interpreting the 14th Amendment: Automatic Citizenship for Children of Illegal
Immigrants?, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 127, 127-28 (1996) (relying on Schuck and Smith to
reach the same conclusion). For some of the criticisms, see Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 54, 65-85 (1997) (attacking the
normative claims of Schuck and Smith); Neil Gotanda, Race, Citizenship, and the Search for
Political Community Among "We the People,"76 OR. L. REV. 233, 248-55 (1997) (pointing out
that Schuck and Smith fail to consider the racial implications of their proposal); David S.
Schwartz, The Amorality of Consent, 74 CAL. L. REV. 2143, 2152-57 (1986) (reviewing
SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 5) (rejecting the moral claim of their mutual consent the-
ory).
14 See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE RISE AND FALL
OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES 88-93, 118-23 (2007) (exploring how the abuses inflicted on
the Tribes influenced the Fourteenth Amendment).
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sionary gloss that should be extended by construction. The revision-
ists' failure to consider this point reflects a broader problem with our
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. While its drafters viewed Na-
tive Americans and African Americans as part of the same battle for
freedom, judges and scholars tend to ignore the tribal side of this
story. That ongoing omission is harmful because it diminishes the re-
sources available to interpret the landmark provisions of that funda-
mental constitutional text, including the Citizenship Clause.
More important, comparing illegal immigrants with original na-
tive-born inhabitants is conceptually incoherent and leads to an in-
terpretive dead-end. The more appropriate analogy is between illegal
aliens and enemy aliens. 15 At common law, the children born to en-
emy soldiers in hostile occupation within the dominions of the Crown
were not considered subjects.' 6 This exception was widely accepted
here when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified and provides a
clear theory for denying citizenship to the offspring of "invaders."'7
Accordingly, the question that we should be asking is whether illegal
immigration is tantamount to a hostile invasion. This analysis is not
only more consistent with the text of the Citizenship Clause, but it
also directly engages the views of those who believe that illegal aliens
pose a threat to our national security.
Part I reviews the law on birthright citizenship and then lays out
the competing view of Schuck and Smith. Part II examines the rela-
tionship between the Tribes and the Fourteenth Amendment and
shows that the evidence cuts against the claim that the treatment of
the Tribes stamps an exclusionary meaning on the "subject to the ju-
risdiction" clause. Part III argues that a better approach would be to
take a fresh look at the common law exception for children born to
enemy soldiers in hostile occupation and concludes under that analy-
15 Only one article explores this angle (albeit briefly). See Wood, supra note 6, at 506-08
(drawing on the distinction in Coke's jurisprudence between enemy aliens and aliens in
amity).
16 See, e.g., A. V. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT
OF LAWs 167 (2d ed. 1908) ("Any person who (his father being an alien enemy) is born in
a part of the British dominions which at the time of such person's birth is in hostile occu-
pation, is an alien.").
17 See, e.g., Inglis v. Trs. of Sailor's Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 156 (1830) (Story, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he children of enemies, born in a place within the dominions of an-
other sovereign, then occupied by them by conquest, are still aliens .... .");JAMES KENT, 2
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 90 (spec. ed., 1986) (1827) (stating that children of
aliens born here in hostile occupation were not citizens); see also Calvin's Case, (1608) 77
Eng. Rep. 377, 398-99 (KB.) (establishing this rule).
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sis that illegal immigration is not the functional equivalent of a for-
eign invasion for citizenship purposes.
I. THE CHALLENGE TO AN AGE-OLD RULE
This Part traces the doctrine on birthright citizenship from the
common law through the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under the conventional view of these authorities, a child born here
to aliens is a citizen so long as the United States has legal and actual
authority over the parents-including illegal aliens. 8  Schuck and
Smith read these same sources as holding that reciprocal consent to
citizenship is required by the Fourteenth Amendment, which would
exclude illegal aliens.' 9 This split between the territorial and mutual
allegiance interpretations of the "subject to the jurisdiction" clause
defines the current impasse.
A. Birthright Citizenship and the Common Law
One fundamental premise of Anglo-American jurisprudence is
that any child born within the dominion and under the authority of
18 See, e.g., Societal and Legal Issues Surrounding Children Born in the United States to Illegal Alien
Parents: Joint Hearing on H.R. 705, H.R. 1363, H.J. Res. 56, H.J. Res. 64, H.J. Res. 87, H.j
Res. 88, and H.J. Res. 93 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & Land Claims and the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciaiy, 104th Cong. 103-04 (1995) (statement
of Gerald L. Neuman, Professor, Columbia University Law School) ("[S]ubject to the ju-
risdiction," in the Citizenship Clause "means actual subjection to the lawmaking power of
the United States.... The common law exceptions included children of foreign diplo-
mats, who were legally immune from domestic law, and children born to women accom-
panying invading armies, who were practically immune from domestic law."); Wood, su-
pra note 6, at 518 (stating that the Citizenship Clause's "subject to" phrase "requires not
only formal jurisdiction, but also more than some minimum degree of actual power on
the part of the United States to bring the parents to justice for disobeying federal law");
see also In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905, 906 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884) (stating thatjurisdiction un-
der the Citizenship Clause must be "actual and exclusive").
19 See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 5, at 116 ("[The Citizenship Clause] should be read to
embody the public law's conception of consensual membership, and therefore to refer
only to... citizens and legal resident aliens."); see also Michael Gunlicks, Note, Citizenship
as a Weapon in Controlling the Flow of Undocumented Aliens: Evaluation of Proposed Denials of
Citizenship to Children of Undocumented Aliens Born in the United States, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
551, 567 (1995) ("[Schuck and Smith] argue that a consensual allegiance to the United
States and consensual protection by the United States, not territorial happenstance,
should be the bases of citizenship for everyone."). Critics respond that the Fourteenth
Amendment itself gave consent to birth citizenship and the contemporary consent of
Congress is not required. See NEUMAN, supra note 8, at 169 ("[A] consensual approach to
citizenship need not imply anything about the powers of Congress."). Thus, a more accu-
rate description of the revisionist view is that Congress retains the discretion to exclude il-
legal aliens from citizenship.
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the sovereign is a citizen.0  In the seventeenth century, Lord Coke
held, "Every man is either alienigena, an alien born, or subditus, a sub-
ject born. Every alien is either a friend that is in league, &c. or an
enemy that is in open war .... ", With respect to enemy aliens, Coke
said that if they "surprise any castle or fort, and possess the same by
hostility, and have issue there, that issue is no subject to the King,
though he be born within his dominions, for that he was not born
under the King's ligeance or obedience., 22  By contrast, allied or
friendly aliens "owed to the King local obedience, that is, so long as
he was within the King's protection; which local obedience, being but
momentary and uncertain, is yet strong enough to make a natural
subject; for if he hath issue here, that issue is a natural born sub-
ject ....,,2' The only exception to this rule was an ambassador, who
was an official representative of a foreign prince and thus owed him
allegiance even when abroad.24
Although Coke's reasoning relied on a feudal premise about the
indissoluble tie between lord and subject, his formulation was
adopted by the United States.2 5 The Supreme Court observed that
20 See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 655 (1898) ("The fundamental princi-
ple of the common law with regard to English nationality was birth within the alle-
giance .... ."); see also Inglis, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 164 (Story, J., dissenting) ("Nothing is bet-
ter settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children even of aliens born in a
country, while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government,
and owing a temporary allegiance thereto, are subjects by birth.").
21 Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 397; see PollyJ. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship
in Calvin's Case (1608), 9 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 73, 74 (1997) ("Calvin's Case became the
basis of the American common-law rule of birthright citizenship, a rule that was later em-
bodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. ... " (footnote omitted)).
22 Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 399.
23 Id. at 384; cf Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 144 (1812) ("When
private individuals of one nation spread themselves through another as business or ca-
price may direct,.., it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous.. . if such indi-
viduals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable
to the jurisdiction of the country.").
24 See Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 399 ("[11f any of the King's ambassadors in foreign na-
tions, have children there of their wives, being English women, by the common laws of
England they are natural-born subjects, and yet they are born out of the King's domin-
ions."); see also Inglis, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 155 ("[T]he children of an ambassador are held
to be subjects of the prince whom he represents, although born under the actual protec-
tion and in the dominions of a foreign prince.").
25 See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 707 (Fuller, CJ., dissenting) ("The rule was the outcome of
the connection in feudalism between the individual and the soil on which he lived, and
the allegiance due was that of liegemen to their liege lord."); Bernadette Meyler, The Ges-
tation of Birthright Citizenship, 1868-1898 States' Rights, The Law of Nations, and Mutual Con-
sent, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 519, 528 (2001) ("Courts in the early United States continued
to follow the jus soli principles that Coke had articulated in Calvin's Case."). A related ex-
ception was created for anyone born on a foreign public ship in our waters. See Schooner
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the birth citizenship rule for aliens "does not appear to have been
contested or doubted until more than fifty years after the adoption of
the Constitution. ' '16  And when a challenge was made in Lynch v.
Clarke,27 a New York court reaffirmed the common law approach and
rejected a reciprocal consent theory of citizenship. 28 Indeed, Lynch
held that "every person born within the dominions and allegiance of
the United States, whatever were the situation of his parents, is a
natural born citizen.,
29
This unequivocal statement of liberty, like so many others in our
tradition, was not applied to slaves and most Native Americans. In
the slave states, positive law simply ousted the common law and de-
nied African Americans citizenship. 0 The Tribes presented a more
complex problem that had no common law counterpart. While they
lived within the United States, most Native Americans retained their
31tribal identity and considered themselves as coequal sovereigns.This status was confirmed by the regular practice of signing treaties
Exch., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 144-45 (holding that the United States lacks jurisdiction over
these vessels); In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905, 906 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884) ("Persons born on a
public vessel of a foreign country, while within the waters of the United States... are also
excepted. They are considered as born in the country to which the vessel belongs.").
26 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 664; see SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 5, at 57-58 ("[A]lthough
children born in America of alien parents were generally assumed to be citizens who pos-
sessed all the rights and obligations of that status, no court seems to have decided a case
directly on the question until Lynch v. Clarke, a New York case decided in 1844.").
27 1 Sand. Ch. 583 (N.Y. Ch. 1844).
28 Id. at 673-79; see also Carens, supra note 8, at 431 ("Lynch v. Clarke ... explicitly rejected
Vattel's public law conception of consensual membership."). Nevertheless, Schuck and
Smith find comfort in this decision because it proves that "the issue was still unsettled
even in 1844." See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 5, at 61. This assertion is false. Although
there were some treatise writers who argued against birthright citizenship, no court ever
accepted this view.
29 1 Sand. Ch. at 663; see In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. at 909 (stating that the issue "was elabo-
rately considered" in Lynch and that the conclusion "was the general understanding of
the legal profession, and the universal impression of the public mind"). This dictum
could be cited as support for birth citizenship of illegal aliens, but the holding of Lynch
addressed the status of a child born to a foreign visitor. See Lynch, 1 Sand. Ch. at 638.
30 By this time, English law held that slavery was contrary to the common law presumption
of freedom and could only be supported by positive law. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 412-13 (1857) (stating that in slave states, African-Americans
"have never been regarded as a part of the people or citizens of the State, nor supposed
to possess any political rights which the dominant race might not withhold or grant at
their pleasure"); Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (K.B.) (Mansfield,
LJ.) (stating that slavery is "so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but
positive law").
31 For an illuminating discussion of these issues, see Chancellor Kent's opinion in Goodell v.
Jackson, 20 Johns. 693 (N.Y. 1823), which held that tribal members owe allegiance to a
tribe and not to the United States.
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with the Tribes, just as the President did with foreign nations . Thus,
the consensus view was that the United States lacked jurisdiction over
these "domestic dependent nations" and that the Tribes were on the
same legal plane as foreign ambassadors with respect to citizenship.
3
Among its many faults, Dred Scott v. Sandford broke with the com-
mon law tradition by holding that birthright citizenship did not apply
to free African Americans. 4 While the lead dissent observed that "it is
a principle of public law, recognised by the Constitution itself, that
birth on the soil of a country both creates the duties and confers the
rights of citizenship,3 5 Chief Justice Taney responded "that neither
the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their de-
scendants, whether they had become free or not, were ... intended
to be included" among our citizenry.36  As Schuck and Smith ob
served, "By making Dred Scott's citizenship turn upon the putative
will and intention of the Framers to exclude all blacks from the
American political community, Taney seemed to embrace the con-
sensual conception of citizenship .... 3 7  Of course, this result was
overruled by the Fourteenth Amendment.
38
32 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-61 (1832); see also 6 REG. DEB. 349
(1830) (statement of Sen. Sprague) (stressing this point in opposing President Jackson's
plan to aid the removal of the Cherokees from Georgia).
33 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (establishing this definition
of the Tribes); see also Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884) (explaining that the Tribes
were not subject to birthright citizenship prior to the Civil War). The constitutional gen-
eration led by AndrewJackson reversed this view of tribal sovereignty, arguing that Con-
gress or the several states possessed full authority to govern the Tribes. See United States
v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846) ("[Tlribes residing within the territorial lim-
its of the United States are subject to their authority, and where the country occupied by
them is not within the limits of one of the States, Congress may by law punish any offence
committed there.... ."); MAGLIOCCA, supra note 14, at 95 ("[A]sJackson had always main-
tained, Congress and the states could govern Native Americans without restriction.").
Even during this period, though, the Tribes retained their sovereignty in the sense that
the United States continued to make treaties with them, and thus birthright citizenship
did not apply.
34 See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407 (stating that neither the Declaration of Independ-
ence nor historical legislation allows for such citizenship).
35 Id. at 578 (Curtis, J., dissenting); seeU.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (stating that "[n]o Person
except a natural born Citizen" is eligible for the Presidency).
36 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407.
37 SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 5, at 72.
38 In this sense, the revisionist argument that the Fourteenth Amendment repudiated the
holding of Dred Scott but embraced its reasoning is implausible. See Carens, supra note 8,
at 437 ("Schuck and Smith clearly want to repudiate, on moral grounds, the treatment of
blacks... endorsed by Dred Scott... but at the same time they want to draw on the argu-
ments used to justify those decisions .... This is a difficult and a dangerous line and one
that is ultimately impossible to sustain.").
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B. The Fourteenth Amendment and Wong Kim Ark
When the Thirty-Ninth Congress got down to work, the conven-
tional view is that they sought to affirm the common law approach to
birthright citizenship and extend the rule to the newly freed slaves. 9
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was the direct antecedent of the
Fourteenth Amendment, held that "all persons born in the United
States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not
taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States.Oo Dur-
ing the debate on the Act, common law precedents such as Lynch
were cited to illustrate the meaning of birthright citizenship. 4' While
the language on "Indians not taxed" was taken from the Constitution
• 42
to indicate that the exclusion of the Tribes would continue, the
phrase "subject to any foreign power" referred to the traditional ex-
ceptions for children of ambassadors and enemy aliens in hostile oc-
cupation.
When Republicans decided to secure and broaden the Civil Rights
Act through the Fourteenth Amendment, the relevant text was
changed to say that all Americans "subject to the jurisdiction" of the
United States were birthright citizens. Once again, the common law
39 See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 675 (1898) ("In the fore front, both of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, and of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the
fundamental principle of citizenship by birth within the dominion was reaffirmed in the
most explicit and comprehensive terms."); id. at 676 (stating that the Citizenship Clause
"is declaratory in form, and enabling and extending in effect").
40 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
41 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832 (1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence) ("In
the great case of Lynch vs. Clarke, it was conclusively shown... that all 'children born
here are citizens without any regard to the political condition or allegiance of their par-
ents.'"); cf In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905, 909 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884) (using Lynch to interpret
the text).
42 See U.S. CONST. art. I., § 2, cl. 3 ("excluding Indians not taxed" for the apportionment of
representatives and direct taxes). Congress granted birthright citizenship to all Native
Americans by statute in 1924. See Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (current ver-
sion at 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (b) (2000)).
43 One scholar says that this language meant that "[a]ny child born on U.S. soil to parents
who were temporary visitors to this country and who, as a result of the foreign citizenship
of the child's parents, remained a citizen or subject of the parents' home country, was not
entitled to claim ... birthright citizenship." John C. Eastman, Politics and the Court: Did
the Supreme Court Really Move Left Because of Embarrassment over Bush v. Gore ? 94 GEO. L.J.
1475, 1486 (2006). This expansive reading is not supported by any evidence, and is con-
tradicted by the citation to Lynch, which held that a child born to a foreign visitor is a citi-
zen. See Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 683 (N.Y. Ch. 1844); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 498 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) ("I understand that under the naturali-
zation laws the children who are born here of parents who have not been naturalized are
citizens. That is the law, as I understand it, at the present time.").
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was invoked to define this language, but the debate centered on
whether this substitute applied to the Tribes." Some contended that
federal statutes already regulated aspects of tribal life and subjected
Native Americans to national jurisdiction." Nonetheless, the phrase
was retained because the floor managers could not agree on a better
alternative. Furthermore, they countered that the Tribes were not
"subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States because they had
their own recognized governments.
In United States v. Wong Kim Ark,46 the Supreme Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment adopted the common law view of birthright
citizenship.46 Ruling that children born in the United States to Chi-
44 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard)
("This amendment which I have offered is simply declaratory of what I regard as the law
of the land already .. "); id. at 2769 (statement of Sen. Wade) (invoking the foreign
ambassador exception). Nothing in the debates sheds any light on the issue of illegal
aliens. The only related reference came from a foe of the Amendment who complained
that it would grant birth citizenship to gypsies. Id. at 2891 (statement of Sen. Cowan).
He argued that the State had a right to reject gypsies because they "invade her borders;
who owe to her no allegiance; who pretend to owe none; who recognize no authority in
her government; who have a distinct, independent government of their own-an im-
perium in imperio." Id. Some of these faults can be attributed to illegal immigrants, but
they do not have their own government.
45 Id. at 2892 (statement of Sen. Doolittle); id. at 2893-94 (statement of Sen.Johnson); id. at
2894-95 (statement of Sen. Hendricks).
46 See id. at 2894-97. In particular, the formulation of "Indians not taxed" was rejected be-
cause it implied that states could control the definition of citizenship by changing tax pol-
icy and might introduce wealth discrimination into the Constitution. See id. at 2894
(statement of Sen. Trumbull) ("[1It would be very objectionable to insert those words
here, because it would make of a wealthy Indian a citizen and would not make a citizen of
one not possessed of wealth under the same circumstances."); id. at 2895 (providing a col-
loquy on whether changes in state taxes would affect Native American citizenship).
47 See id. at 2895 (statement of Sen. Howard) (explaining that "the jurisdiction of the
[tribal] nation intervenes and ousts what would otherwise be perhaps a right ofjurisdic-
tion of the United States"); id. at 2893 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) ("We make treaties
with them, and therefore they are not subject to our jurisdiction."); see also In re Look Tin
Sing, 21 F. 905, 909 n.2 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884) ("These tribes are independent political
communities, retaining, in many respects, the right of self-government... ; and a mem-
ber thereof, though born in the country, is not, by his birth, a citizen of the United States,
under the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment. He is not born under their actual and exclusive
jurisdiction, which the [A] mendment contemplates.").
48 169 U.S. 649, 681 (1898).
49 See id. at 563 ("The question ... is whether a child born in the United States, of parents of
Chinese descent, who at the time of his birth are subjects of the Emperor of
China .... and are not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity .... becomes at
the time of his birth a citizen of the United States. . . ."). In its first reading of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Court stated, "The phrase 'subject to its jurisdiction' was in-
tended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or sub-
jects of foreign States, born within the United States." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1873). This dicta from Slaughter-House was rejected as erroneous in
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nese immigrants were citizens, the Justices "detailed at some length
the history of the Citizenship Clause, and the predominantly geo-
graphic sense in which the term 'jurisdiction' was used."50 They con-
cluded that the purpose of the "subject to the jurisdiction" language:
[WIould appear to have been to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words,
(besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar
relation to the National Government, unknown to the common law,) the
two classes of cases-children born of alien enemies in hostile occupa-
tion, and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign State-both
of which, as has already been shown.... had been recognized exceptions
to the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the country.
The emphasis on territoriality was an integral part of the common law
approach dating back to Coke, which held that citizenship was di-
rectly tied to the government's legal and practical authority.5
C. A Mutual Consent Approach to Citizenship
The Court has not revisited Wong Kim Ark, but Schuck and Smith
offer a reading of the Citizenship Clause that connects the exclusions
to birthright citizenship with a principle of reciprocal consent or al-
legiance. After conceding that the common law held that citizenship
applied to aliens "under circumstances in which the sovereign pos-
sessed the power to provide protection to the subject and was actually
exercising it to at least some minimal degree," they argue that deter-
WongKim Ark. See Wong Kim Ark 169 U.S. at 678 ("It was unsupported by any argument,
or by any reference to authorities; and.., was not formulated with the same care and ex-
actness, as if the case before the court had called for an exact definition of the
phrase .... "). I was sympathetic to recent rehabilitation efforts on behalf of Slaughter-
House, see Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporation Straight: A Reinterpretation of the
Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 648-49 (2000), but this error on the Citizen-
ship Clause leads me back to the conclusion that Justice Miller's opinion for the Court
really was a sloppy effort.
50 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211 n.10 (1982). At the time, this question was controversial
because naturalization laws barred parents of Asian descent from becoming citizens; thus,
some commentators argued that their children were excluded from birthright citizen-
ship. See also Meyler, supra note 25, at 532-37 (describing the lively discussion of this is-
sue in the law reviews).
51 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 682.
52 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying test. Compare CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2897 (1866) (statement of Sen. Williams) ("All persons living within ajudicial district may
be said, in one sense, to be subject to the jurisdiction of the court in that district, but they
are not in every sense subject to the jurisdiction of the court until they are brought, by
proper process, within the reach of the power of the court."), with Eastman, supra note
43, at 1488 (concluding that Wong Kim Ark did not "appreciate[] the distinction between
partial, territorial jurisdiction, which subjects all who are present within the territory of a
sovereign to the jurisdiction of its laws, and complete, political jurisdiction, which re-
quires allegiance to the sovereign as well.").
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mining status by birth was in tension with the democratic ideal that
citizenship was a matter of personal choice. 5' For instance, the com-
mon law held that citizenship could not be renounced, as the bond
between subject and King was perpetual.54  The Founders rejected
this principle in the Declaration of Independence, and the same
Congress that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment also passed the
Expatriation Act, which stated that it was "a natural and inherent
right of all people" to renounce their citizenship. 5  Thus, mutual
consent and birthright citizenship were each living traditions when
the "subject to the jurisdiction" provision was written.
Schuck and Smith further contend that this clause modified birth-
right citizenship with a consent requirement, and their leading evi-
dence comes from the debate about the Tribes.56 When Senator
Trumbull was asked why jurisdiction was lacking over the Tribes, he
said that the term meant "[n]ot owing allegiance to anybody else." 7
In a similar vein, Senator Howard stated that the Tribes were ex-
cluded because "full and complete" jurisdiction was required, which
53 SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 5, at 14; see id. at 23-36 (summarizing the arguments made
by Locke and other writers on behalf of a consent theory). In most respects, Schuck and
Smith track the views expressed by the dissenters in Wong Kim Ark. See Carens, supra note
8, at 434 ("The similarities between [the dissenters'] line of argument and the one ad-
vanced by Schuck and Smith could hardly be more striking."). This is awkward because
they agree with the holding of the case,just as they disagree with the holding of Dred Scott
while backing its consent-based approach to citizenship. See supra note 38. One scholar
explains that "[t]he unintended but inevitable consequence of Schuck and Smith's rea-
soning would be the symbolic rehabilitation of Dred Scott. . . and the symbolic repudiation
of Wong Kim Ark." Carens, supra note 8, at 437.
54 See Calvin's Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 407 (K.B.) (stating that allegiance was irrevo-
cable). Accordingly, the Royal Navy held that it had the right to impress Americans into
its service long after the Revolution because they were British subjects for life. See also
SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 5, at 54.
55 SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 5, at 86-87; see also Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 711 (Fuller,
C.J., dissenting) ("[F]rom the Declaration of Independence to this day, the United States
have rejected the doctrine of indissoluble allegiance and maintained the general right of
expatriation, to be exercised in subordination to the public interests and subject to regu-
lation.").
56 See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 5, at 85-86 (stating that the jurisdiction rule "added to
the ineradicably ascriptive birthright citizenship rule a transforming consensual concep-
tion of the necessary connection between an individual and his government-a concep-
tion that was... more profoundly political than one emphasizing the individual's mere
presence on the soil at birth"); id. at 84-85 ("[T]he jurisdiction requirement was elabo-
rated most fully and carefully in connection with the congressional debates (and later ad-
judication) over the question of Indian birthright citizenship .... ").
57 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2893 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull). If this
quote were taken seriously, then dual citizenship would be prohibited. See Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. at 720 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) ("[D]ouble allegiance in the sense of double na-
tionality has no place in our law.... .").
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would be the same "in extent and quality as applies to every citizen of
the United States now.,58 Both statements support what Schuck and
Smith describe as a "more demanding formulation" of jurisdiction
that required national authority and consent to citizenship. 59 They
also cite the Court's opinion in Elk v. Wilkins,60 which held the Tribes
were not entitled to birthright citizenship because the clause meant
"not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of
the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdic-
tion, and owing them direct and immediate allegiance.",61  In the
Court's words, this expressed a "principle that no one can become a
citizen of a nation without its consent."
62
The revisionist argument does provide a reasonable basis for the
continuation of the common law exceptions into the modern era.
Instead of viewing the ambassador and tribal categories as situations
where the United States lacks the legal authority to grant birthright
citizenship, Schuck and Smith observe that in each case there was no
63consent to citizenship by both sovereigns. Enemy aliens in hostile
occupation did not fall under the actual authority of the government
at common law, but one could also say that birthright citizenship was
inappropriate because a sovereign did not consent to the presence of
foreign troops on its soil. Reciprocal allegiance therefore makes as
much sense of these precedents as a territorial view ofjurisdiction.
Theories of territory and mutual allegiance part company on the
issue of illegal aliens. Stated simply, these immigrants would be ex-
cluded from birth citizenship under a consent approach because the
58 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2895 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
59 SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 5, at 82-83.
60 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
61 Id. at 102 (1884). In Wong Kim Ark, the Court limited this case to its facts. See Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S. at 682 ("The decision in Elk v. Wilkins concerned only members of the In-
dian tribes within the United States, and had no tendency to deny citizenship to children
born in the United States of foreign parents of Caucasian, African or Mongolian descent,
not in the diplomatic service of a foreign country.").
62 Elk, 112 U.S. at 103. The issue in Elk was whether a Native American automatically be-
came a citizen when he left his tribe and subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the
United States. Though there was significant evidence that the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment would have said yes, the Court held that these individuals would have to ap-
ply for naturalization just like any other alien. See also Gerard N. Magliocca, The Cherokee
Removal and the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 DUKE LJ. 875, 945, 950 (2003) (looking at the
decision and the legislative history).
63 See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 5, at 85 (stating that "this privileged status of diplomats
was one to which both governments consented"); id. at 83 (stating that the Tribes "had
never chosen or been chosen to be United States citizens").
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United States does not consent to their presence.' But under a for-
mulation based on the authority of the federal government, illegal
aliens are included so long as they are not beyond the reach of the
authorities, as is the case when territory is occupied by a foreign
power. To resolve this dispute, we must choose between these com-
peting readings of the "subject to the jurisdiction" clause.
D. Standard Criticisms of Schuck and Smith
There are many points that could be made in response to the revi-
sionist interpretation, but the two that are the most germane to this
historical analysis relate to the textual meaning of jurisdiction and to
the presence (or lack thereof) of illegal aliens when the Fourteenth
Amendment was written. 5 The first objection puts a lot of pressure
on Schuck and Smith's invocation of the Tribes' status as support for
their approach, while the latter calls their entire project into ques-
tion.
All of the confident assertions that the word 'jurisdiction" in the
Citizenship Clause means "allegiance or consent" run up against the
problem that this is not how the term is usually defined.66 Justice
Holmes gave the standard explanation that "U]urisdiction is power,"
by which he meant that the willingness of a party to be hailed before
a court is irrelevant. For example, it would be strange if a criminal
defendant could assert a defense based on his lack of consent to the
State's prosecutorial authority. Likewise, illegal aliens in deportation
proceedings would not get far by asserting that the tribunal lacked
64 Given the lax enforcement of the immigration laws, one could say that the United States
is granting tacit consent to the presence of illegal aliens. The best understanding of the
Schuck and Smith position, however, is that formal consent is required by both parties for
birthright citizenship.
65 One of these criticisms would be on stare decisis grounds, which Schuck and Smith dismiss
as a "reflexive acceptance and legitimation of the status quo." SCHUCK & SMITH, supra
note 5, at 131. Another would address the pragmatic implications of any interpretive
change, such as the loss of "administrative clarity and simplicity of the current birthright
citizenship rule." Id. at 133.
66 See NEUMAN, supra note 8, at 171 ("The word jurisdiction has various meanings in Ameri-
can law, but it has never been defined in terms remotely resembling the elaborate con-
struct on which the revisionist argument depends.").
67 Cordova v. Grant, 248 U.S. 413, 419 (1919); seeJames C. Ho, Defining "American": Birth-
right Citizenship and the Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, 9 GREEN BAG 2D
367, 368 (2006) ("When we speak of an individual who is subject to the jurisdiction of a
court, he must follow the judgments and orders of that court, whether he likes it or
not.").
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jurisdiction because they did not consent.68 This does not mean that
an alternative reading is incorrect.69 It does indicate, however, that
Schuck and Smith must rely on legislative history, rather than on the
ordinary meaning of the text, to make their case. And as stated ear-
lier, their principal source is the debate on the Tribes.7 °
The other obstacle to the revisionist argument is that illegal aliens
were here when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and they
received birth citizenship just like everyone else under the authority
of the United States. A common refrain among critics of the current
constitutional custom is that there were no illegal immigrants when
the Citizenship Clause was written; hence, the drafters did not con-
71sider the problem. While it is true that no general immigration
statute was enacted until after Reconstruction, Gerald L. Neuman
points out that the immigration (or importation) of slaves was barred
long before the Civil War.7 2 Nonetheless, illegal smuggling of slaves
was widespread and tens of thousands entered the country in this
fashion. 73 Presumably, under a mutual consent theory of birthright
74
citizenship, the children of these illegal slaves could not be citizens.
68 Indeed, one could say that illegal aliens are illegal precisely because they are subject to
the jurisdiction of the authorities under federal immigration law.
69 On the other hand, the Supreme Court held that illegal immigrants are "within the juris-
diction" of the states pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 211-13 (1982). Thus, a persuasive explanation is required to show why "subject to
the jurisdiction" should be read differently. See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 5, at 157-58
n.40 (arguing that the words "subject to" and "within" bear different constructions);
Wood, supra note 6, at 520 (arguing that equal protection is not a zero-sum game the way
citizenship is).
70 See supra text accompanying notes 56-62.
71 See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 5, at 95; Wood, supra note 6, at 515.
72 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205 ("Since the late 19th century, the United States has restricted
immigration into this country."); NEUMAN, supra note 8, at 178 (describing the ban on the
foreign slave trade); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (prohibiting Congress from re-
stricting the "Migration or Importation" of slaves until 1808); Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22,
2 Stat. 426 (prohibiting the importation of slaves into the United States as of January 1,
1808). Neuman also says that illegal immigrants were familiar to the Framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment because states regulated immigration during the antebellum years.
See NEUMAN, supra note 8, at 176-78.
73 See NEUMAN, supra note 8, at 179 ("Conservative estimates of the numbers of illegally im-
ported slaves put them in the tens of thousands."); C. VANN WOODWARD, AMERICAN
COUNTERPOINT 82 (1971) (stating that an estimate of 54,000 for the number of illegal
slaves imported into the United States from 1808 to 1861 is "persuasive"). These captives
were subject to deportation back to Africa. See Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 101, 3 Stat. 532,
533 (authorizing the President to regulate the deportation of "all such negroes, mulat-
toes, or persons of colour" who are brought to the United States in connection with the
slave trade).
74 See NEUMAN, supra note 8, at 179 ("There is no consistent principle by which the citizen-
ship clause can be interpreted as simultaneously including all native-born former slaves
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Since an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that does not
make all African Americans citizens is patently absurd, the reciprocal
allegiance theory appears inadequate .
Neuman's challenge postdates Schuck and Smith's book, but
there are at least two responses to his point on slavery. The first is
that the transformative thrust of the Fourteenth Amendment on the
issue of racial justice could be read broadly to grant birth citizenship
to African Americans in spite of their illegal status.76 If that sounds
too radical, a more conventional answer is that the illegally imported
slaves were relatively few in number and constituted a de minimus ex-
ception to the mutual consent principle that cannot be applied to the
much greater number of illegal immigrants arriving now. 7" For those
who hold that there should be no exceptions based on sheer num-
bers, it is worth noting that the common law's exclusion for enemy
aliens in hostile occupation could easily be described as a de maximus
exception to a territorial rule of birthright citizenship. This suggests
that the enemy alien category deserves more scrutiny than it gets in
the current debate on how illegal aliens should be treated, both on
the slavery point and as a more general source of guidance.
In sum, the revisionist argument against birthright citizenship for
children of illegal immigrants turns on how the Framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment conceptualized the Tribes' status under the Citi-
zenship Clause. Although Schuck and Smith do an admirable job of
parsing the legislative history, the next Part explores the abolitionist
background that they ignore.
and excluding all children of parents to whose entry into the country the nation has not
consented.").
75 There is no indication in the legislative history, however, that the Framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment ever considered the issue of illegal slaves.
76 An analogous problem arose when the first African-American senator presented his cre-
dentials to the Senate Chamber in 1870, and Democrats asserted that he was ineligible to
serve as a senator because the Constitution requires senators to have been citizens for
nine years. See Richard A. Primus, The Riddle of Hiram Revels, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1681,
1682-85 (2006) (exploring the constitutional and substantive justice aspects of the Senate
debate). Since the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, no African American in
1870 could claim nine years of citizenship without: (1) a rather creative reading of the
requirement, or (2) an acknowledgement that Reconstruction worked a significant
change on behalf of racial equality that altered the textual meaning.
77 Another, less plausible answer to the illegal alien point holds that "it is at least misleading
to claim that there were illegal aliens at the time of the framing of the Fourteenth
Amendment" because these aliens did not face "a significant risk of deportation." Wood,
supra note 6, at 490. Even if this were true, it is not clear why the means used to enforce
immigration laws is relevant to the question of their status with respect to birthright citi-
zenship.
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II. BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP AND THE TRIBES
This Part explores the reasons behind the decision to declare the
Tribes beyond the nation's jurisdiction, and links that choice to the
broader relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and Na-
tive Americans. Though the abolitionist movement was primarily
concerned with securing basic rights and equal treatment for African
Americans, discrimination against Native Americans also influenced
their thinking about these issues. Schuck and Smith, like almost all
other interpreters of Reconstruction, miss this point and fail to see
that the "subject to the jurisdiction" clause was actually part of an ef-
fort to enhance tribal rights rather than restrict them. Thus, this lan-
guage does not have an exclusionary cast that can be extended by
construction to give Congress the discretion to deny birthright citi-
zenship for illegal alien children.
A. The Trail of Tears and the March of Freedom
The catalyst for the popular mobilization that gave us. the Four-
teenth Amendment was the removal of the Cherokees from Geor-
gia.7  Prior to that time, most anti-slavery activists supported the de-
portation of slaves, not abolition, as the best solution.79 When
President Andrew Jackson sought to impose a similar policy on the
Cherokee Tribe by shipping them into exile west of the Mississippi,
however, these leaders were appalled by its brutal reality.s Indeed,
78 The argument presented in this portion of the text is developed at much greater length
in my recent book onJacksonian Democracy and the Constitution. See MAGLIOCCA, supra
note 14, at 88-93, 118-23.
79 See Mary Hershberger, Mobilizing Women, Anticipating Abolition: The Struggle Against Indian
Removal in the 1830s, 86J. AM. HIST. 15, 35 (1999) (noting that even William Lloyd Garri-
son, the vocal abolitionist and editor of the Liberator, supported colonization as late as
1829); see also RONALD G. WALTERS, THE ANTISLAVERY APPEAL: AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM
AFTER 1830, at xi (1976) (noting that the sudden conversion of the leaders of the anti-
slavery movement to an abolitionist view during the 1830s "haunts everything written on
the subject").
80 See Andrew Jackson, First Annual Message (Dec. 8, 1829), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 442, 458 (James D. Richardson
ed., 1897) (stating that he informed "the Indians inhabiting parts of Georgia and Ala-
bama that their attempt to establish an independent government would not be counte-
nanced by the Executive of the United States, and advised them to emigrate beyond the
Mississippi or submit to the laws of those States"); Linda K. Kerber, The Abolitionist Percep-
tion of the Indian, 62J. AM. HIST. 271, 272-73 (1975) (describing the activities of the anti-
slavery activists against the Removal Act and noting their shift shortly thereafter to an
abolitionist position); LIBERATOR, July 21, 1832, at 114 (attacking "Andrew Jackson, and
all his subordinate land-stealing, negro-thieving, missionary-persecuting, and Cherokee-
murdering gang"); see also RONALD N. SATZ, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE JACKSONIAN
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many of them said that this experience transformed their views on
slavery. For example, James Birney abandoned colonization in the
1830s because of the "very great resemblance it bears, in its most
prominent features, to that of the Indians, who have been moved
upon, in nearly the same manner to 'consent' to leave their lands."8'
Likewise, William Lloyd Garrison said slaves were "as unanimously
opposed to a removal to Africa, as the Cherokees from the council-
fires and graves of their fathers" and connected these issues in his
new abolitionist paper, the Liberator."'
As the abolitionists gathered strength over the next three decades,
they often invoked the Cherokee Removal as part of a broader argu-
ment that Native American and African American freedom were in-
extricably linked. Indeed, "[flew comments are more common in
their speeches than that their goal was that both blacks and Indians
be secured in their rights as men."8 4 They were particularly fond of
ERA 101 (1975) ("One Georgia volunteer engaged in removing the Cherokees remarked
years later, 'I fought through the civil war and have seen men shot to pieces and slaugh-
tered by thousands, but the Cherokee removal was the cruelest work I ever knew.'").
81 Letter from James Gillespie Birney, Late Vice President, Ky. Colonization Soc'y, to Rever-
end Thorton J. Mills, Corresponding Sec'y, Ky. Colonization Soc'y (July 15, 1834), in NEW
YORK OFFICE OF THE ANTI-SLAVERY REPORTER (1834); see BERIAH GREEN, SKETCHES OF THE
LIFE AND WRITINGS OF JAMES GILLESPIE BIRNEY 10 (Utica, NY, Jackson & Chaplin 1844)
("[F]rom the Indian to the Negro, the transition was easy and natural .... [Birney] could
hardly fail to see, when the wrong of the Indians had thoroughly aroused him, that the
sufferings of the Negro flowed from the same bitter fountain."); Letter from James Birney
to Joshua Leavitt and Others(Jan. 10, 1842), in 2 LETTERS OF JAMES GILLESPIE BIRNEY
1831-1857, at 645, 652 (Dwight L. Dumond ed., 1938) (statement upon being offered the
presidential nomination of the Liberty Party) ("We have so long practiced injustice, add-
ing to it by hypocrisy, in the treatment of the colored race, both negroes and Indians,
that we begin to regard injustice as an element-a chief element-the chief element in
our government.").
82 HENRY MAYER, ALL ON FIRE: WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON AND THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY
138 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); see LIBERATOR, Jan. 26. 1833, at 15 ("So
said the government of Georgia, in regard to the removal of the Indians-we don't com-
pel them to go. No, Sir, they did not compel the Indians to go; but then, they rendered
them so uncomfortable, by their oppression and injustice, that the poor Indians can't stay.
And just so it is, Sir, with the Blacks."); see also MAGLIOCCA, supra note 14, at 91 (reproduc-
ing the masthead of the Liberator that depicted a slave auction being conducted on top of
trampled "Indian treaties").
83 See, e.g., 8 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, DIARY OF CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS 50 (Aida Donald &
David Donald eds., 1964) ("It is Slavery that is at the bottom of this. I am more satisfied
of the fact every day I live."); see also Kerber, supra note 80, at 277-78 (explaining that the
Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society's Annual Report in 1838 focused on the Cherokee
Removal).
84 Kerber, supra note 80, at 290; see ROBERT WINSTON MARDOCK, THE REFORMERS AND THE
AMERICAN INDIAN 12 (1971) (quoting the abolitionist view that slavery was "an extension
of the unneighborly, unChristian, and destructive practice which for generations has
been operating against the Aborigines" (internal quotation marks omitted)); John
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Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester v. Georgia,85 where he
tried (unsuccessfully) to protect the Cherokees and the missionaries
in their midst by articulating a broad view of tribal sovereignty.1
6
Consequently, anti-slavery leaders invoked Worcester as a milestone in
87the struggle for universal freedom.
The bond between African-American and Native-American liberty
remained vital when the abolitionist generation reached the summit
of power during Reconstruction."8 As the National Anti-Slavery Stan-
dard stated, one of the "good results of the abolition of chattel slavery,
and of the... iniquitous system, [is] that a more just policy is now
sought and recommended in relation to the Indians." 9 While the
famed Joint Committee on Reconstruction was proposing the Four-
teenth Amendment and investigating the conditions of the freedman,
a similar Joint Committee on the Tribes was looking into their situa-
tion and advancing a series of broad reforms. 9° And in a direct re-
buke to Jackson's treatment of the Cherokees, the Senate Judiciary
Committee declared that Worcester was "the unquestioned law of the
Greenleaf Whittier, Letter from the Editor, PA. FREEMAN, May 10, 1838, at 2 ("The same
despotic, cruel, and diabolical spirit that oppresses the African race, acts in all its un-
earthly force and virulence against the poor Indians.").
85 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
86 See MAGLIOCCA, supra note 14, at 42-51, 92-93 (exploring the political context surround-
ing the case and the reasons why abolitionists seized upon it); Diary Entry of Salmon P.
Chase (July 2, 1843), in 1 THE SALMON P. CHASE PAPERS, JOURNALS, 1829-1872, at 169,
169 (John Niven et al. eds., 1993) (quoting a pastor who "asked for the deliverance of the
land from Slavery among other sins & evils & in Sermon spoke of the imprisonment of
Butler & Worcester in Geo [rgia] Penitentiary").
87 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 135, 139 (1857) (statement of Rep.
Bingham) ("The extra-territorial legislative power of every State is limited to its own citi-
zens and subjects. That is the decision of the Supreme Court, in the great case of
Worcester vs. the State of Georgia .... The Constitution is based upon the EQUALITY of
the human race."); Ableman v. Booth, 11 Wis. 498, 529 (1859) (quoting an abolitionist
pamphlet stating that "Georgia's resistance to the appellate jurisdiction of the [S]upreme
[C] ourt first sprung from jealousy of interference with the 'peculiar institution'").
88 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2D SESS. 1956 (1868) (statement of Rep. Broomall)
(refuting the doctrine "that black men and red men have no rights whatever except by
the grace and favor of the white men"); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 260 (1865)
(statement of Rep. Rollins) (rejecting the doctrine that the Declaration of Independence
.was applicable alone to white men, and not to the black man, the red man, or any other
than the white man").
89 NAT'L ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD, Apr. 10, 1869; see MARDOCK, supra note 84, at 48 (quoting
Wendell Phillips's view that the "great poison of the age is race hatred .... We must see
the man, not the negro, the man and not the Indian, the man and not the Chinaman").
90 See S. REP. NO. 39-156, at 1-4 (1867) (summarizing the findings of the Joint Committee
on the Tribes).
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court to-day" that "no man acknowledging the authority of reason
can gainsay."9'
The critical point is that Reconstruction Republicans also used
Worcester and the Cherokee Removal as interpretive guides for the
Fourteenth Amendment. For instance, the drafter of Section 1, John
Bingham, told his constituents and colleagues that "[u] nder the Con-
stitution as it is, not as it was, and by force of the [F]ourteenth
[A] mendment, no State hereafter can.., ever repeat the example of
Georgia and send men to the penitentiary, as did that State, for
teaching the Indian to read the lessons of the New Testament.0
2
Other Members of Congress echoed this cite to Worcester since they
could "certainly recollect twenty-five or thirty years ago when the
whole country rang with moral indignation against the treatment of
those Indians by citizens of Georgia."9 3 As one congressman from
Massachusetts said, "The principal danger that menaces us to-day is
from the effort within the States to deprive considerable numbers of
persons of the civil and equal rights which the General Government
is endeavoring to secure to them. 94  Given that context, "[t]he his-
tory of the Indian tribes within our jurisdiction is an instructive les-
son .... In the famous case of the Georgia Indians, the judiciary of
the nation went to the extreme of its power in protecting the rights of
the weak and defenseless. '" 95
91 S. REP. No. 41-268, at 6-7 (1870) (examining the relationship between the Tribes and the
Fourteenth Amendment).
92 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham); see
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74 (1947) (Black,J., dissenting) (describing Bingham
as the "Madison of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment"); CINCINNATI DAILY
COMMERCIAL, Aug. 10, 1866, at 1 ("If you rally at the fall.., depend upon it that every
State South will rally to the lead of Tennessee, and ratify the Amendment. Is not that
worth striving for? Then hereafter, in Georgia, men shall not be imprisoned, as in the
past, for teaching the lowly to read in the New Testament of another and a better life."
(quoting Bingham's statement in a campaign speech)). Indeed, this was the one exam-
ple that Bingham always used to explain why we needed the Fourteenth Amendment.
93 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1671 (1870) (statement of Rep. Maynard); see CONG.
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 142 (1869) (statement of Rep. Burleigh) ("Every stu-
dent of American history must remember the excitement which this [Removal] treaty
produced throughout the country and the influence it exerted upon our national poli-
tics."); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1684 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens) ("I
remember, sir, when a law was passed by the State of Georgia extending the jurisdiction
of that State over the Indian lands within the State .... I trust that we shall never disgrace
the national legislation by any act which will give the sanction of law to such an outrage as
I have cited.").
94 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 335 (1871) (statement of Rep. Hoar).
95 Id.
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There are powerful implications from this deliberate decision to
incorporate Native Americans into Fourteenth Amendment analysis.
First, this experience adds a new facet to many of the guarantees in
the Bill of Rights that were applied to the States by Section 1.96 A
prior article of mine explained how Bingham's reliance on Worcester
to define religious freedom undermines the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Employment Division v. Smith.97 Likewise, judges and scholars
could obtain new insights into the Second Amendment by examining
how gun regulations applied to Native Americans Second, the con-
cept of equality is changed in subtle ways once the interpretive base-
line is expanded beyond African Americans. 99 Native Americans
could be defined in racial terms, but they could also be defined by
their cultural practices involving religion, marriage, and lifestyle." °" If
these choices are integrated into an equal protection analysis, then
this opens up new ways to assess the State's power to enforce moral
standards.l l
B. Worcester and the Citizenship Clause
Most of the time, the history laid out in the previous Section is ig-
nored when the Fourteenth Amendment is applied, largely because
the African American paradigm totally eclipsed its tribal counterpart
in the twentieth century. The Citizenship Clause is the exception to
96 This view holds whether one thinks that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment in-
tended to incorporate the Bill of Rights, see CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84
(1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham), or rests on the conclusion that the Due Process
Clause of Section 1 selectively incorporates those rights, see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325-36 (1937).
97 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause is not violated when a
neutral law imposes a substantial burden on religious practice); see Magliocca, supra note
62, at 953-60 (criticizing this decision).
98 When one Senator asked whether the Fourteenth Amendment would invalidate state laws
that barred whites from selling guns and alcohol to Native Americans, see CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 573 (1866) (statement of Sen. Williams), the reply only defended
the state's power to regulate alcohol sales, see id. (statement of Sen. Henderson). The
Takings Clause is another provision that bears reexamination, as the confiscation of tribal
land without compensation is a powerful legacy of our country's history.
99 See Magliocca, supra note 62, at 960-65. One discrimination case that cried out for a com-
parison to the Cherokee Removal was the wartime internment ofJapanese-Americans. See
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944).
100 See United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 617 (1877) (holding that the Pueblos did not
qualify as a Tribe because they did not share the cultural practices of other Native Ameri-
cans); id. at 616 (describing the Pueblo as "Indians only in feature [and) complexion").
101 For a thoughtful discussion of the tension between individual autonomy and cultural as-
similation, see generally KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL
RIGHTS (2006).
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this trend, and thus Schuck and Smith deserve credit for seeing the
importance of the Tribes in this context. And because information
on the link between Worcester and the Fourteenth Amendment was
not available when they wrote their book twenty years ago, their fail-
ure to consider the issue is understandable. Nevertheless, that evi-
dence refutes Schuck and Smith's analysis, demonstrating that the
exclusion of the Tribes from citizenship was done out of respect for
Worcester and not to import a reciprocal consent principle.""
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment worried that a grant
of birthright citizenship would undermine the autonomy that Worces-
ter held was a fundamental right of the Tribes. As the Senate Judici-
ary Committee said, "an act of Congress which should assume to treat
the members of a tribe as subject to the municipal jurisdiction of the
United States would be unconstitutional and void" unless it is "consis-
tent with their character as separate political communities or
states. Furthermore, Senator Trumbull said that it would be "a
breach of good faith on our part to extend the laws of the United
States over the Indian tribes ... in which treaties we have agreed that
we would not make them subject to the laws of the United States.
10 4
Critics of this reading (and there were many) replied that all Native
Americans were entitled to citizenship, because otherwise they would
not be treated equally.10 5 In this respect, there was a tension between
Worcestes vision of tribal sovereignty and the ideal of equal citizen-
ship, which was resolved by holding that members of Tribes were not
102 This was not, of course, the only motivation for excluding the Tribes. For instance, Sena-
tor Trumbull explained that Indians at war with the United States could not be given citi-
zenship. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 527 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull)
("Of course we cannot declare the wild Indians who do not recognize the Government of
the United States at all... to be the subjects of the United States in the sense of being
citizens. They must be excepted.").
103 S. REP. NO. 41-268, at 9-10 (1870). See generally id. at 9-11 (analyzing the relationship be-
tween the Fourteenth Amendment and the Tribes).
104 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2894 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull); see also S.
REP. NO. 41-268, at 11 (stating that the United States could not abrogate these treaties
unilaterally through passage of the Fourteenth Amendment). If this were the only objec-
tion to tribal citizenship, then Schuck and Smith's mutual consent theory would stand on
solid ground. The problem is that consistency with Worcester was the primary concern.
105 Compare CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 574 (1866) (statement of Sen. Henderson)
("We are deciding to-day that [the Constitution] was made for the white man and the
black man, but that the red man shall have no interest in it."), with id. (statement of Sen.
Trumbull) ("We are not deciding any such thing."). For a sample of the views in favor of
full Native American citizenship, see CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1670 (1870)
(statement of Rep. Paine), CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 125-26 (1869) (statement
of Rep. Niblack), and CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 559-60 (1869) (statement of
Rep. Butler).
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citizens but that individual Native Americans who were not members
of Tribes would be considered citizens.1
6
The debate and contemporaneous reading of the Citizenship
Clause, as informed by the abolitionist movement, does not support
the claim that the "subject to the jurisdiction" requirement changed
the traditional understanding of birthright citizenship. It is clear that
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not write the jurisdic-
tion provision to transform the law in this area. Instead, they wanted
to rescue the common law rule from the clutches of Dred Scott and re-
store the authority of Worcester, which for all practical purposes was a
nullity during the Jacksonian era.10 7 This conclusion is confirmed by
the fact that there is nothing specific in the legislative history about
limiting birthright citizenship through a mutual allegiance theory,
whereas there are specific references to the common law and Worces-
ter' ° Since Schuck and Smith must rely on original understanding to
overcome the ordinary textual meaning given to jurisdiction, this lack
of support in the historical record is fatal to their claims.
Another way to look at the significance of Worcester for the revi-
sionist claim relates to the rule of construction that should apply to
the Citizenship Clause. Schuck and Smith could be saying that the
"subject to the jurisdiction" language is ambiguous with respect to il-
legal aliens and should receive an exclusionary reading. From the
sources considered here, however, there can be little doubt that the
drafters excluded the Tribes because they felt that this was the best
way to maximize Native Americans' rights.'0 9 Turning around and
construing that text to eliminate unambiguously the rights of a class
of children is not consistent with the underlying purpose of the pro-
vision with respect to the Tribes."0 The Framers of the Fourteenth
106 See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 112 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 was "the first general enactment making persons of the Indian race
citizens of the United States"); id. at 120 (citing Cooley's treatise for the proposition that
a Native American not affiliated with a tribe had the same rights "as that of any other na-
tive born inhabitant").
107 See MAGLIOCCA, supra note 14, at 69-73, 94-96 (describing Worcestes moribund status
during the preceding thirty years).
108 Accordingly, the stray comments about "allegiance" and "consent" that are cited by
Schuck and Smith simply cannot bear the weight that they put on them. See supra notes
57-62 and accompanying text.
109 It goes without saying that this strategy did not work well. See Magliocca, supra note 62, at
949-52 (exploring what happened following Reconstruction).
110 See Martin, supra note 5, at 295 (stating that reciprocal consent is a harmful principle
"when society excludes those who realistically have no home elsewhere and therefore de-
serve the status of member in the only national society to which they are connected. This
was the essential vice of Elk v. Wilkins and Dred Scott").
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Amendment viewed exclusion as a necessary evil that was imposed
over the objections of those who wanted full Native American citizen-
ship. Extending this decision by construction is therefore not appro-
priate, particularly given all of the other interpretive objections to
such a move.
In sum, the bond between abolitionists and Native Americans
works against the revisionist interpretation of the Citizenship Clause
by showing that the exclusion of the Tribes was based on respect for
the principles enunciated in Worcester. The discussion now turns to
the question of whether some other theory can justify the repeal of
birth citizenship for illegal immigrants.
III. INVASION AND EVASION
This Part contends that any sound analysis of illegal alien citizen-
ship must rest on a comparison to the common law exception for en-
emy aliens in hostile occupation of a sovereign's land. Schuck and
Smith's tribal analogy only confuses matters because there is no con-
ceptual similarity between the original native-born inhabitants of our
country and its most recent immigrants. Yet there is a potential par-
allel between foreign invaders and illegal aliens, who both enter the
country unlawfully and are subject to expulsion. Accordingly, the
operative question is whether illegal aliens, like enemy occupiers, are
beyond the actual authority of the United States. The answer to this
constitutional question is no.
A. The Relevance of Foreign Soldiers
No exception to the rule of birthright citizenship comes closer to
the dilemma raised by illegal immigrants than the one reserved for
enemies in hostile occupation."' In each case, the host country has
legal jurisdiction over the intruders and does not want them on its
soil. 1 2 The problem is that the government cannot enforce its will,
111 The United States has never invoked this exception to birthright citizenship, though the
issue has arisen in other contexts when U.S. territory was occupied. See United States v.
Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246 (1819) (holding that the British occupation of towns in
Maine (then part of Massachusetts) during the War of 1812 suspended the operation of
customs laws there).
112 There could be some narrow exceptions under international law, whereby a sovereign
would not have a lawful right to eject foreign invaders, but that need not concern us here.
The fact that lawful combatants are exempt from ordinary judicial process under the Ge-
neva Conventions is irrelevant because the home country has the right to detain those
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which is relevant because the common law held that a sovereign must
be in actual possession of power to confer birthright citizenship.
1 3
With respect to a hostile army hunkered down in Massachusetts, this
lack of authority is comprehensive until the force is destroyed or
driven out. When it comes to illegal aliens, the problem lies with the
administrative task of finding the wrongdoers when they can hide in
plain sight.
1 4
Putting aside the legal similarities between illegal immigrants and
enemy aliens in hostile occupation, the comparison also makes sense
given that many Americans see both as threats. Illegal aliens are not
enemies in the sense of the common law because they almost all
come from friendly or neutral nations in Latin America. One might
conclude, though, that these illegal workers are an economic threat
because they drive down wages for some citizens or lawfully admitted
aliens. Similarly, one could say that these migrants pose some kind of
cultural danger because they do not speak English or do not adhere
to our values. Of course, these claims can be and often are chal-
lenged. The point is that opponents of illegal immigration are far
more likely to make a connection with enemy invaders than with Na-
tive American Tribes, whose relationship to the issue is not at all ob-
vious.
B. An Issue of Enforcement
If the proper analogy is with enemy aliens in hostile occupation,
then the next issue worth considering is the degree of authority re-
quired to meet the jurisdictional element of the Citizenship Clause.
Foreign armies are beyond the sovereign's control in a way that is not
comparable to illegal aliens. Nevertheless, that does not mean that
troops and hold them as prisoners of war. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
113 See Inglis v. Trs. of Sailor's Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 155 (1830) (Story, J., dis-
senting) ("[T]he party must be born within a place where the sovereign is at the time in
full possession and exercise of his power.... ."). Though the principal issue for asserting
jurisdiction over the Tribes was a formal recognition of their sovereignty, it must be con-
ceded that some of them were strong enough to block the United States from asserting its
authority in a concrete way.
114 One could say that the comparison is inappropriate because the common law exceptions
involved the official representatives of the sovereign (soldiers or ambassadors). Cf
Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 144 (1812) (holding that foreign
visitors are not exempt from the home country's jurisdiction unless they are employed by
the sovereign or "engaged in national pursuits"). Nevertheless, there is nothing about of-
ficial status that bears on the issue of whether the United States has actual, as opposed to
formal, jurisdiction over the individuals in question.
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the United States' authority over the latter group is sufficient to say
that they still qualify for birthright citizenship.
The best argument for the proposition that the enemy alien ex-
ception encompasses illegal aliens comes from Charles Wood, the
former counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee
on Immigration. 5 Wood says that "it would be reasonable for Con-
gress to conclude that illegal aliens are not 'subject to' the jurisdic-
tion of the government.., and that the federal government's actual
power to bring illegal aliens to justice is insufficient to satisfy the con-
stitutional standard for birthright citizenship."''1 6 Indeed, "[i]t seems
indisputable that such power is substantially less than the power with
respect to other violators of the law."'"1 7 That is true because "it is es-
sentially only their status, and not their actions, which distinguishes
them from the law-abiding persons around them" and so "they face
relatively little risk of being brought to justice."1l
Conceding that there are difficulties involved in apprehending il-
legal aliens, the problem with Wood's argument is that the United
States could be doing a lot more to enforce its borders. Opponents
of illegal immigration never tire of pointing out that we could build
fences along the Rio Grande, crack down on corporations that hire
illegal aliens (by reviewing their Social Security information), or re-
fuse to give these immigrants a driver's license."9 These are just a few
of the measures that could be taken if the political community really
wanted to address the issue. The failure to enforce the immigration
laws is not about a practical inability to do so; rather, it is about the
practical conclusion that robust enforcement is not worthwhile.
Whether that choice is right or wrong, a blas6 attitude is a far cry
from the impossibility of enforcing the sovereign's will.
Wood anticipates the force of this objection, and his answer is that
"even if the probability of their apprehension and prosecution were
greatly increased it is unlikely ever to be equivalent to that of other
lawbreakers." 20 Even if this claim is correct, the question is why con-
115 See Wood, supra note 6, at 510-11 (arguing that the government's inability to actually
bring illegal aliens to justice exempts them from birthright citizenship); id. at 465-66
(giving Wood's credentials and outlining his argument generally).
116 Id. at510.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 For a thoughtful discussion on the driver's license question, see Maria Pab6n L6pez, More
Than a License to Drive: State Restrictions on the Use of Driver's Licenses by Noncitizens, 29 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 91 (2004).
120 Wood, supra note 6, at 511.
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stitutional jurisdiction requires an enforcement level that is equal to
other wrongdoers. Just as it is inadmissible for a criminal defendant
to assert that jurisdiction is lacking because she did not consent to
the tribunal, a claim that there is no jurisdiction because the en-
forcement of this crime was not equivalent to that of other crimes
would be laughed out of court. As with Schuck and Smith's mutual
consent approach, the ordinary meaning of jurisdiction does not
support Wood's interpretation on this score.
Not surprisingly, Wood defends his unorthodox reading of juris-
diction by citing the same legislative history about the Tribes that
Schuck and Smith used to support their theory. For instance, he im-
plies that Senator Howard's declaration that "full and complete" ju-
risdiction is required by the Citizenship Clause that is "the same juris-
diction in extent and quality as applies to every citizen of the United
States now" supports a rule of enforcement parity.2 2 No such conclu-
sion is warranted. First, these comments were made about the lack of
formal, not actual, authority with respect to the Tribes, and thus say
nothing relevant about the issue Wood wants to talk about. Second,
for the reasons stated in Part II, construing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's treatment of the Tribes in an exclusionary manner is inconsis-
tent with its Framers' intent. Third, complete sovereignty does not
mean that there will always be effective law enforcement. The fact
that it is harder to catch certain types of criminals simply does not af-
fect jurisdiction unless the enforcement gap is acute and impossible
123to cure.
In sum, the only analytic framework that makes sense for the issue
of birthright citizenship for illegal alien children is a comparison to
the exception for enemy aliens in hostile occupation. Although the
jurisdiction element of the Citizenship Clause does require the
United States to exercise real authority over its territory, there is no
reason to think that the government could not do so with respect to
illegal immigrants if it actually tried. Perhaps this issue could be re-
121 See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (explaining how the ordinary use of juris-
diction contradicts the mutual allegiance interpretation).
122 Wood, see supra note 6, at 508-10 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2895
(1866) (statement of Sen. Howard) (emphasis in Wood)); supra notes 58-59 and accom-
panying text (showing how Schuck and Smith rely on these quotes). I use the word "im-
plies" because Wood never really develops this point, but it is the most logical reading of
the relevant passage in his article.
123 Furthermore, it is far from clear that immigration violations are inherently more difficult
to enforce than arguably victimless crimes like prostitution or gambling. As a result, the
premise that even a full-court press would not yield constitutionally adequate enforce-
ment to qualify as jurisdiction is probably wrong.
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visited if the federal government took strong action that came to
naught; but under present circumstances, the only reasonable con-
clusion is that jurisdiction does exist and birth citizenship does ap-
ply. 124
CONCLUSION
There is undoubtedly some tension between the right of a nation
to control its borders and a rule of birthright citizenship that applies
to illegal aliens. From the common law, we have inherited a welcom-
ing tradition that considers birthright citizenship too precious to be
left in the hands of Congress. Though the federal government re-
tains broad discretion to deport illegal immigrants, any child born
under the legal and actual authority of the United States is a citizen.
The revisionist arguments by Schuck and Smith cannot overcome the
formidable authority standing in their way.
Nevertheless, Schuck and Smith's analysis provides a valuable ser-
vice by focusing attention on the relationship between the Native
American Tribes and the Fourteenth Amendment. Sadly, the neglect
that breeds hopelessness on reservations even today is matched by the
indifference of lawyers toward the role that tribal life played in the
evolution of our great guarantees of freedom. By probing the citi-
zenship claims of outsiders, Schuck and Smith end up exposing a new
paradigm for thinking about the rights of all Americans.
124 Put another way, Congress should not be able to alter longstanding constitutional doc-
trine on birthright citizenship by just asserting that they lack the necessary authority over
illegal immigrants. Instead, Congress should be put to the test and demonstrate that it
cannot deport or drive out this population, even by using the full might of the federal
government.
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